With American leadership in doubt, can its allies trace their own course? : NPR

Ben Bland is the director of the Asia-Pacific program for Chatham House, an international political reflection group based in London. He is also the author of two books on Asian politics.

Even before President Trump returned to the White House earlier this year, conversations with diplomatic officials and security across Europe and Asia revealed a deep contradiction. On the one hand, the American allies fear the rupture of the international order which has supported its stability in recent decades. On the other, they hesitate to invest in the structural changes necessary to adapt to a more uncertain world.

But that can change. The American allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have shown an increasing desire in recent months to coordinate and cooperate through a wide range of common interests, from trade to defense and the management of alliances to China. As democratic intermediate powers which are committed to opening trade and investment, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, the most important European allies in Washington, have a lot in common with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, the Indo-Pacific Pillars of the American Alliance System.

The foreign ministers of these seven countries and Poland, another key European security player, encounter Recently on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, recognizing that “peace, security and resilience in Indo-Pacific and Europe become more intertwined”. Meeting in a new format, and without the United States, even with regard to American soil, they have promised to cooperate more closely on maritime security, cybersecurity, economic security, climate change and wider geopolitical uncertainties.

With regard to economic policy, these countries seek to protect themselves from the armament by Beijing from its domination in manufacturing and emergence technologies. They are also looking for better defenses against increasing protectionist pressures from the United States, which prior to President Trump’s return to the White House.

How we, allies, can we organize ourselves with each other?

Whether Autarky has a meaning or not for superpower like America, its allies in Europe and Indo-Pacific will suffer in a world where obstacles to trade and investments continue to increase. Significant and advanced and open savings such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Australia will have to work much harder in the years to come to defend the free movement of goods, services and investments.

An avenue to do so is cooperation around the complete and progressive agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a regional trade agreement which was supported by Washington before President Trump retired in 2017. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are the members of the CPTPP, while South Korea plans to join the membership, and the European Union has discussed Trade links of the CPTPP.

Another area where these nations could form a stronger coalition is technology. China and the United States are taking increasingly assertive measures while arguing leadership in key technologies, artificial intelligence and semiconductors with electric vehicle batteries. None of the main Washington allies has the financial weight or the business basis to compete in its own right. But they can pool knowledge and resources to try to ensure that they are not left behind. And they can discuss how to avoid being isolated in a world of bifurcked technological systems and standards.

On defense and intelligence, there is clearly no substitute for the role of anchoring that Washington plays. However, European and Indo-Pacific Allies are already expanding links between them, rather than relying on the United States for leadership, connections and defense purchases. For example, instead of obtaining fighters from the United States, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom is already working together to develop their own new generation plane as part of the Global Combat Air program. This could be the beginning of a wider thrust to intertwine defense and security between allies in Europe and Indo-Pacific.

Overcome tensions and direct without a leader

This change is not to break the links with Washington. On the contrary, it is a question of reacting to changes in American internal policy and of ensuring that the American allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific can make more significant contributions in its own right.

However, coordination between the intermediate powers in Europe and Asia without the American management will be difficult.

Within the EU, France and Germany are still colliding with their own joint hunting hunting program, the future combat air system, doubt because of the political argument and the commercial rivalry. The United Kingdom is repairing its fences with its European neighbors after Brexit, but standing outside the EU makes it difficult to defense and industrial cooperation.

In Indo-Pacific, historical tensions between Japan and South Korea have in the past have limited their ability to cooperate with the United States and other allies.

It will take a vision to look beyond these tensions and intelligent leadership to find creative, flexible and profitable solutions. If the American allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific fail to do more together, only they will not have the resources or the scale to prosper in these uncertain times.