NATO summit: Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy

But developments this week, which show China higher than ever on the agendas of these bodies, signal a growing alignment between the United States and its partners.

They also mark a significant setback for Beijing, which has tried to drive a wedge between US and EU positions on China, observers say.

« The combination of the kind of language used by the G7 and (the formal inclusion of China) in NATO strategic documents is indeed a blow to (China), and something they would have hoped for and wished we could prevent, » Andrew Small said. , senior transatlantic researcher of the Asia program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

“This is an exceptionally strong time in terms of transatlantic cooperation and it translates for China in a way that it is very concerned about,” he said.

On today’s agenda

China’s concerns were clear this week as its foreign ministry pushed back against being labeled a « systemic challenge » in NATO’s new strategic vision., is expected to be approved at the bloc’s summit, which began on Tuesday.

« China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or export ideology, much less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be called a ‘systemic challenge?' » ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday.

“We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop issuing false and provocative statements against China,” he said, adding that NATO should “stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after having disturbed Europe ».

But this rhetoric – accusing NATO of ‘disruption’ in Europe – is part of what is driving a change in the European outlook, analysts say, as Beijing has done. refused to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively accusing the United States and NATO of provoking Moscow.

China « aligned very quickly and very clearly – at least in words, not so much in deeds – with Russia », while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine following of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen. , researcher in the Europe program of the Chatham House think tank in London.

The contrast between the two helped drive a « democracies versus autocracies » narrative in Europe, he said, adding that domestic politics also played a role.

« In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is seen by far as the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already begun to crumble, but the fact that China aligns itself so clearly with Russia accelerated the change, » Bergsen said. said.

Growing concerns about China within the G7 – made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US – were reflected in the joint statement from the block, released after a summit in German Bavaria.

The document, which mentioned China a dozen times – up from four references in the G7 leaders’ statement a year earlier – touched on areas of cooperation, but focused on calling on China to improve its record. respect for human rights and respects international rules.

And in a mark of how Russia has shaped the bloc’s view on China, the group called on Beijing to « pressure » Moscow to comply with United Nations resolutions and stop its military aggression. The statement follows what Washington called the « official launch » on Sunday of a $600 billion G7 infrastructure investment initiative, first announced last year.

The campaign, which the European Union said would “demonstrate the power of development finance when it reflects democratic values,” was an apparent attempt to counter China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, which critics say Beijing has used it to bolster its global influence.

« Challenges posed »

But that does not mean that opinions in Europe and on both sides of the Atlantic are aligned with China. This may be most clearly visible at NATO, where exactly how the 30-nation bloc should deal with China has been a key area of ​​debate.

In recent years, as NATO statements have begun to refer to China, some members and observers have expressed concern that taking a too strong stance could turn China into an enemy.

Others have viewed China as outside the region’s core security interests.

Following a NATO meeting last June, where leaders called China a security challenge, French President Emmanuel Macron downplayed the move, saying « China is not in the North Atlantic ».

Some of these concerns still exist, even amid an emerging “authoritarians versus democracies” narrative promoted by the United States, according to Pierre Haroche, European security researcher at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris).

« Do you want to solidify the ‘dragon-bear monster’ to show that there is a clear ideological ‘cold war’ between democracies and autocracies, because it’s convenient in terms of storytelling? Or is it (a better) strategy to say that the two (China and Russia) are very different actors… who could even, in the future, oppose? said Haroche, summing up the debate.

But while differences of opinion may exist between member states, it is clear that NATO is thinking bigger at this year’s summit, with the historic inclusion of leaders from New Zealand, Australia, South Korea South and Japan.

The move was met with anger in China, where officials have long argued that NATO is seeking to expand its presence in the Indo-Pacific, which Beijing considers its own neighborhood.

“Cold War sewage cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean – that should be the general consensus in the Asia-Pacific region,” said an editorial in the Communist Party-affiliated nationalist tabloid Global Times on Tuesday. .

But observers characterized this not so much as an expansion of NATO into the Indo-Pacific, but rather as an attempt to strengthen relations between, in the words of the NATO secretariat, « countries sharing the same ideas”.

These democracies across the Pacific, like their European counterparts, may now view the threats they face as more connected, according to Small of the German Marshall Fund.

“There is much more of a feeling emerging from all of this, conditioned by the challenge from China, by the challenge from Russia, that democratic allies need to be more effectively coordinated,” he said.