Federal investigators have determined that the wildfire that destroyed much of Pacific Palisades on Jan. 7 was a so-called “remnant” of a smaller fire that was intentionally set on New Year’s Day, about a week earlier.
After Los Angeles firefighters extinguished the Jan. 1 blaze known as the Lachman Fire, it continued to smolder and burn underground, “unbeknownst to anyone,” according to federal officials. They said high winds six days later caused an underground fire to start and spread to the surface, which became one of the costliest and most destructive disasters in the city’s history.
The revelations — uncovered in a criminal complaint and attached affidavit charging alleged arsonist Jonathan Rinderknecht — raise questions about what Los Angeles firefighters could have done to prevent the blaze in the days before the expected Jan. 7 windstorm and the extraordinary fire risk that would ensue.
“This affidavit places responsibility on the firefighters,” said Ed Nordskog, former chief of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s arson unit. “A commission must examine why this rekindled fire was able to reignite. »
He added: “The arsonist started the first fire, but firefighters have a duty to do certain things proactively. »
A Times investigation found that LAFD officials did not deploy any engines to the Palisades before the Jan. 7 fire, despite warnings about severe weather. To prepare for the winds, the department has staffed only five of the more than 40 engines available to supplement the regular firefighting force.
These engines could have been prepositioned in the Palisades and elsewhere, as had been done in the past during similar weather conditions.
Kenny Cooper, special agent in charge of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives who helped investigate the origin of the Palisades fire, said the responsibility for restarting the fire rests solely with the person who started it.
“This fire burned deep into the ground, into the roots and into the structure, and remained active for several days,” Cooper said. “No matter how good they are, they can’t see it, can they?”
But, he added, wildland firefighters typically patrol for days or weeks to prevent the flames from resuming.
When he worked at a state forestry agency, he said, “We would have a lightning strike, and it would hit a tree, and it would burn for days, sometimes weeks, and then ignite into a wildfire. We would suppress that, and then every day, for weeks, we would patrol those areas to make sure they didn’t reignite,” he said. “If we saw evidence of smoke or heat, then we would provide resources for that. So, I know it’s a common practice, and it’s just a very difficult fire burning underground.”
The affidavit provides a window into the firefighting timeline on Jan. 1, when just after midnight the Lachman Fire ignited near a small clearing off the Temescal Ridge Trail.
00:13: An image taken by a UCSD camera, about two-tenths of a mile away, shows a bright spot in the upper left – the Lachman Fire.
00:20: Rinderknecht drives down Palisades Drive, passing fire trucks heading toward Palisades Drive, responding to the fire.
That night, the LAFD, with assistance from Los Angeles County firefighters, used water drops from airplanes and sprinkler lines, as well as hand lines dug by Los Angeles County crews, to attack the fire, according to the complaint. Firefighters continued suppression efforts throughout the day on January 1, wetting areas within the fire perimeter. Once suppression efforts were completed, the affidavit states, fire crews left the fire hoses on site, in case they needed to be redeployed.
January 2: LAFD personnel returned to the scene to retrieve the fire hoses. According to the affidavit, it appeared to them that the fire was completely out.
But investigators determined that during the Lachman Fire, a firebrand took hold in the dense vegetation, continuing to smolder and burn in underground roots. Strong winds brought the embers to the surface, turning into a deadly fire.
